institute of cultural capital

The Culture and Education District
A scoping review for the Arts and Humanities Research Council

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Appendix D: Creative Work Strand Report

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Introduction

The CED (Culture and Education District) is more or less unique; it has some resonance with developments in the middle east (Doha, Dubai and Abu Dhabi) in terms of de novo university or cultural districts. At the same time, it has an echo of the development of creative clusters popular in Europe. As such it is a hybrid, and that makes it difficult to evaluate. At a simple level, aside from urban regeneration, the district presents an opportunity for co-location with similar activities, with an added benefit of potential collaboration. Whilst much has been written about the potential of such districts, little attention has been paid to the actual benefits, and over what sort of time period they may accrue.

This section of the report concerns an initial study and scoping of the necessary parameters of an evaluation of the economic and cultural relationships across the CED. Its core insight concerns the added value of co-location and agglomeration. Simply that the real benefits have to emerge from active networking and meaningful interaction. Given the nature of the activities, this interaction is primarily about the non-material: ideas and knowledge. Thus, our focus has been on evaluating the potential and prospect of actual network making processes. With ground only just being broken on the first developments, there is little actual interaction to evaluate. However, we focus on the planning and expectations, as well as the inherited resources; as well as the existing development challenges that indicate the real challenges that the CED faces going forward. This is summarised in our six key points:

1. The long timescales involved (and the differing time horizons of stakeholders, communities and the wider public;
2. The complex and interwoven processes that cut across these timescales;
3. The variable geometry of the spaces of action and the boundaries thus created and perceived;
4. The changing priorities and short and long-term objectives of stakeholders, communities, politicians and policy-makers;
5. That 'impact' is experienced in a variety of ways, and over many time scales, by each stakeholder; and finally,
6. Co-location does not create knowledge exchange, and added value; network making and knowledge management/governance is the key factor.

The commonly anticipated benefits of co-location are lowered transportation costs between related products or between subcontractors; and, the exchange of knowledge as know-how, or new ideas. Co-location has traditionally been considered as the best way to overcome the 'friction of distance'. However, whilst this is logically true, in practice it is perhaps better regarded as a necessary, but not sufficient condition. There are a range of issues that may confound the expectation of exchange of products or part finished goods: commonly cited ones relate to trust and organisational non-isomorphism (small companies and large companies find it difficult to trade with one another); however, they are different in various industries and processes. The physical costs of movement are less significant when the object to be transferred is knowledge. The important barriers may not be distance by network and institutional configurations, and the enabling of interaction. All of these issues, the co-location and the in-practice exchange, are subject of barriers, which are often referred to as transactions costs.

There is a third sphere of transactions costs that have more relevance to information and cultural exchange, immaterial exchanges, and un-traded interdependencies. The literature suggests that these transactions are often dependent on social and cultural interactions, which require complex face to face contact. These can cover tacit skills and resources, as well as very specific coded information. Collectively these are more often than not qualitative information, that is situated in its value (time, process and place dependent). Unlike conventional marketed goods and services, the 'price' is seldom set in a market, and it is often based on reciprocal and long-term relationships. Thus, the 'invisible hand' of the market is

disabled, and transactions can fail to happen or be sluggish without 'market makers'. Typically, 'market makers' are intermediaries that act as, in effect, brokers to facilitate knowledge exchange. In discussion of innovation and the information economy the importance of non-traded and non-proprietary information exchange has been argued to support 'open innovation systems' (Chesbrough 2003). That is, those that are within a network (usually proximate, but not necessarily) are able to benefit from the information circulation. Research on creative hubs has highlighted (Pratt, Dovey et al. 2016; Virani and Malem, 2015), the role of hub facilitators who act as intermediaries matching and sharing information, as well as identifying strategic gaps (Pratt 2017).

As noted in the introduction to this report, creative districts face a range of developmental challenges; networking being one of them (Sacco and Segre 2009, Sacco, Ferilli et al. 2013, Sacco, Ferilli et al. 2014). The reason being in many cases that the focus is placed on physical land assembly, and with tenant occupancy; it adds a risk to be selective about tenants (to achieve a 'match'), or to invest in further 'networking' resources. However, the academic literature points to the critical importance of sustaining and supporting such an infrastructure for long term success. Our interest in this case study is to understand how networking might be evaluated, in terms of its overall contribution, but also in terms of its effectivity. This focus is all the more relevant in that the CED marketing (as with other developments of this type), and the anchor tenants, have pointed to this factor as one of the key (potential) benefits.

Evaluation, as we have already pointed out earlier on in this report, is fraught with many difficulties. The methodology of evaluation is more suited to closed systems where a single variable can be isolated and manipulated. In open systems, that are live, evaluation requires considerable ingenuity. Put simply, the main factors to control, and to set, are time and space: the start and the end; and, where the physical boundaries are. These parameters are held as prerequisite, and then the policy objective indicates an independent variable, and dependent variables are then identified to be measured and the relationship then modelled. There is an extensive literature on policy evaluation that reviews the challenges (Bartels, Nicol et al. 1982, Roche 1994, Hambleton and Thomas 1995, Raco and Imrie 2000). As will be evident, all of the parameters and variables are difficult to measure and define in this case.

Moreover, as policy evaluation and project evaluation are more often than not multiple, there are several interacting projects, all within the shell of the mega-project (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius et al. 2003). It is logically possible to map these systems of relationships but they quickly exceed the ability to qualify or quantify the components. Moreover, the processes/projects are all working with different time-scales; and the stakeholders have different objectives, and various auditing moments for their KPIs. A universal evaluation is extremely challenging. As also noted in the introduction, drawing upon the mega-project literature we follow its lead to focus on two dilemmas: the desire to minimise risk that leads to an over estimation of the efficacy of the project (in our case we are looking at networking); the lack of a trade-off between efficiency and democracy, simply the challenge of transparency and 'open' communication (which we see as being intimately linked to 'open innovation' debates as well).

For the above reasons, we have rejected an a priori method of fixing parameters and variables; we have sought to reverse the logic and show how parameters of action emerge from processes that develop on the CED. This is a sort of ethnographic, or at least a process following, approach that discovers the important variables for different actors, at different times. Moreover, it allows one to understand the various values created in the project, rather than reducing it to one 'currency' and 'time-scale'. This is our methodological innovation, to develop a method for a more relevant evaluation(Diez 2001). The approach opens up the questions of whose value?, and, to whom is it valuable? which have often been side-lined (Zukin 1995), or omitted, in evaluations (especially those associated with social and cultural issues). Finally, it allows us to explore the question of relative value, or relational value, rather than labelling one party or action 'good' or 'bad'. That judgement can still be made, but it always relates to a situated judgement.

The study

As will be clear from what follows, it would be incorrect and unhelpful to represent the development of the Queen Elizabeth Park and environs as simple, linear for straightforward. At the time of writing, July 2017, stakeholders and policy makers, and the media see the development as one of an emerging legacy of the Olympic games. However, as we will note, contrary to this view the delivery of legacy was, to an extent, an afterthought, part of the strategic manoeuvring to achieve a winning bid; moreover, what precisely the legacy might be, and for whom, is and will continue to be, contested.

Anybody who has reviewed Olympic projects and their evaluations, and mega-projects more generally, will not find such a tale surprising. It might be argued that rather than a deviation from the norm, this is how mega-project develop. This is an important point of departure for our study, an alternative or non-normative starting point that affects the way that we have analysed the development of the CED, and which tools of evaluation are appropriate to the task. We do not seek to define a narrow set of parameters (that are artificial) within which to evaluate the project. Instead, we turn the idea on its head, we seek out the relevant parameters from the process. Lest, it be seen as an avoidance of 'evaluation', we will argue that it encompasses many evaluations (qualitative and quantitative). It is simply unhelpful to reduce the project to one, or even a narrowly prescribed set of metrics. However, the multiple perspective evaluation we are seeking to construct potentially provides something of more value to the actually existing stakeholders and participants, some live and reflective feedback that they might have the option to act upon, rather than wait until the project is 'complete' (which is an arbitrary date).

The practical approach that we employed was a trawl of secondary information about the development focusing on land use and planning decisions, local and strategic. Our main sources are publicly available planning documentation. This is complemented by documentary and secondary sources from people who have occupied these sites, and participated in public debates about them. This is clearly, not an ideal corpus, but it highlights the challenges of doing long-term research; especially an 'evaluation' that begins after the 'beginning'. Of course, part of the argument is to problematize the notion of a beginning. We would anticipate the need to roll forward our evaluation, focusing on interviews at discrete time periods, over the next 20 years.

Clearly, as suggested by the inclusion of historical information, the time scale for major projects is very long; nominally we have begun with 20 years; but would argue that at least another 20 years will be needed to approach completion. We need to emphasise that by far the majority of evaluations of any projects are post-hoc evaluations, whose beginning and end is delimited by a tranche of capital funding from a public body. The evaluation is required as part of internal audit for the public body, and hence is usually takes place before the social and cultural activities have run to maturity. The vast majority of evaluations cover a period of months, and exceptional one or two years. What we are suggesting here is a complete step change (one that is habitually mentioned in the final paragraphs of every evaluation).

As noted above, space as well as time parameters need to be controlled in any evaluation. In our study, we can identify multiple boundaries of the 'case study', from the Olympic site, to the CED, Stratford, the East End, the Queen Elizabeth Park, the Lower Lea Valley, etc. The boundaries, in part, relate to particular policies and funding arrangements, especially compulsory purchase and planning control. Again, reducing to one, or simply aggregating all, would be misleading. Moreover, as most evaluation studies mention there are always boundary effects, where the existence of the boundary produces an artificial impetus. So, when you mix in boundary effects, and multiple and changing boundaries the reality is complex. In fact, we focused our concerns on what are, in effect, multiple boundary effects.

Finally, we have to note that the independent variable of the CED is not self-evident, nor stable. By default, in such evaluations an economic measure such as net jobs gained, unemployment lowered, or number of firms attracted are usual (but far from unproblematic measures). Obviously, these metrics are a proxy for the overall performance. However, proxies are only as good as the model and the calibration against which they are evaluated. The 'engine' of the CED is a network process, and not an object of production (like that emerging from a production line). Accordingly, our concern was to identify and analyses the emergence of these network effects that so much of the marketing, and 'high theory', and politics focuses on (but does not evaluate, nor interrogate, at first-hand).

The triple challenges of time and space boundaries, and objective – critical for any conventional evaluation – are addressed here in our attention to the 'long history' of the development. Whilst, formally, a late 2012 start date could be proposed, we show that a relevant evaluation time period extends back to at least 1997. Moreover, the plans of key stakeholders and communities: the universities and museums have phased investments running at least until 2022; and that is only the end of the building phase; the communities will live there much longer. So, it would not be unreasonable to consider at least 2030 as a cut-off point. We can see similar issues with the relevance of the boundaries of the CED, the Olympic Park, or East London. Finally, we can see that the legacy – the top-line objective has been subject to considerable redefinition; and more recently, the notion of interactivity has emerged.

The format for the review of the process of development is subdivided into a number of strands: strategy, land use, and community of practice. Moreover, we have divided the time scale into two, sub-divided by the games. One of the questions we pose is the relevance of the year 2012 as an analytic point of origin.

Part 1: Pre – 2012

Strategy: Mayor of London and the GLA

Work on the London bid project started in February 1997 by four working groups set up to develop specific areas or themes for a possible Olympic bid (LOCOG, 2012, p. 16). As a result, the decision was taken in 2000 to bid for the 2012 games (Ibid). It was clear to the BOA (British Olympic Association), that as a result of failed Olympic bids to the 1996 and 2000 games, and in order to learn from the past, any new bid needed to show 'clear and unequivocal support from three main organising stakeholders: Central government – to provide financial underwriting and political will; city/local government – to sign the Host City Contract and provide transport and land; and the British Olympic Association – to submit the bid to the IOC' (LOCOG, 2012, p. 17). It was felt by the bidders that this would ameliorate the chief reason why London had failed previously in securing the UK nomination as a bid city; namely, a lack of cohesion in local government and at the local level (Ibid). The election of the mayor and the creation of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in 1999 / 2000 paved the way for a bid that would be able to be designed without falling into the same pitfalls as previous bids (Ibid). Moreover the creation of the London Development Agency (LDA), who oversaw most of the land use activities once the location had been agreed upon, would be a mechanism for facilitating and catalysing the process adding another layer of support (Ibid). Thus, with the creation of the Mayor and the GLA, a triumvirate of organising stakeholders were in place and the organising committee for the games could start looking into the bid process in earnest with an aim of going for the 2012 games. The next step would be solidifying the location which would have large implications on the bid itself as well as nascent concerns about Olympic legacy.

a. Location of the Olympic site:

An unforeseeable change occurred regarding the location of the games. According to LOCOG, decision-making on sports venues were contingent on a few important parameters:

> *Accessibility – good road and rail links for both Olympic Family and spectators; legacy – use existing venues where possible, temporary installations where necessary and new builds where needed; adherence to international Federation requirements – at this stage this meant looking specifically at venue capacities and field-of-play/warm-up area dimensions; travel times to the venues – these realistically needed to be under 30 minutes from the Olympic Village; and training facilities – emphasis on sporting legacy to the local community, all located within 45 minutes of the Olympic Village* (LOCOG, 2012, p. 19).

Originally there was an implied understanding that the new Wembley Stadium would be the agreed upon location, however the Wembley project was beleaguered by a host of difficulties. It was earmarked for demolition in 2000 with a hope to be fully reconstructed by 2003; however, due to a number of legal issues demolition did not start until 2002 thereby essentially forcing the BOA to rethink its use as the Olympic stadium. The new Wembley was finished in 2007, but mired in legal controversy affecting its inclusion in any Olympic plans. It was on the back of these difficulties at Wembley (as well as transport issues involving the second potential site of Picketts Lock) that the BOA decided to produce a report looking at other potential locations for staging the Olympic Games in London (LOCOG, 2012). The main concern was the site of the Olympic Village where, through the resource of the London Planning Advisory Committee, fifty potential sites were identified (Ibid).

Location factors were a defining component of the Olympic bid not only due to the issues at Wembley, a monumental setback, but also due to plans that were already in motion at local level to deliver on the first version of what is known as the London Plan. The London Plan is the statutory 'spatial development strategy' for the Greater London area produced by the Mayor of London and first published by the Greater London Authority in 2004 – with subsequent versions leading to a brand-new London Plan for 2017 (London Plan, 2017). The first version laid the strategic plans set out for East London and the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley (Mayor of London, 2004). The London Plan started being developed as part of the Greater London Authority Act of 1999 which specified the creation of a 'spatial development strategy' (GLA Act, 1999). It reiterated a long-standing policy priority; namely, the regeneration of the Lower Lea Valley. The Lower Lea has been under development since the early 2000s as a result of the Blair government demarcating it a part of the Thames Gateway area. The Thames Gateway was and still is a priority regarding urban regeneration initiatives due to what the government views as large areas of deprivation stemming back to the 1970s. It also laid out plans for West London, North London and South London although East London was by far the most pressing of them all due to what many policy makers at the time saw as large swathes of land in the Hackney Wick area, the Docks, and Isle of Dogs being essentially unusable, and highly toxic, Brownfield sites as well as the need to not encroach on usable open spaces (Mayor of London, 2004 p. 6). The land reclamation agenda for East London was strong in policy leading up to the publication of the first London Plan.

Thus, three potential Olympic sites emerged: West London, North east London, and East London. The West London option was based around Wembley Stadium and, when this no longer seemed viable, contingencies were drawn up for other sites although none of them were used due to more inherent problems (LOCOG, 2012). The North-east London option – Picketts Lock- was not favoured due to access issues and lack of proximity to existing venues and the city centre (Ibid). The East London option – Stratford – was seen as a contingency following the debacle at Wembley; this site had the most potential in terms of space, availability and access – but also with regard to regeneration policy and the London Plan. The top two locations for the Village were Hackney Wick/Eastway and Stratford (Ibid).

Interestingly, the BOA presented the options to the newly-elected mayor Ken Livingstone and the Greater London Authority in May 2001, who 'preferred an East London-based Games which he saw as providing more regeneration possibilities than the west London alternative' (LOCOG, 2012, p. 20) – aligning nicely with the GLA Act of 1999 and the spatial development strategy outlined within - what would soon become the London Plan (2004). Tessa Jowell announced the London bid in May 2003 and subsequently announced the creation of the bid team called London 2012 Ltd headed by Barbara Cassani (founder of the budget airline Go Fly), who were essentially tasked to deliver a proposal based on a new stadium at Stratford (LOCOG, 2012). Thus, the story so far suggests that having a regeneration legacy for the Olympic Games in 2012 stemmed from the lack of availability of Wembley Stadium as well as the already existent regeneration policy that had been established prior to any concrete plans of undertaking an Olympic bid. In fact, the Olympic bid would speed up the regeneration of the Lower Lea by being aligned to it.

Soon after Tessa Jowell's announcement came another - of an Olympic bid that was based on five themes: Delivering the experience of a lifetime for athletes; leaving a legacy for sport in the UK; supporting the IOC and the Olympic movement; compact, iconic and well-connected venues; and finally, benefiting the community through regeneration (LOCOG, 2012). Over the last 20 years the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has embraced sustainability, and specifically that an 'Olympic Legacy' should be prioritised by host cities (IOC, 2013). In their words:

> To take full advantage of the opportunities that the Games can provide, a potential host city must have a strong vision and clear objectives of what the Games, and even bidding, can do for its citizens, city and country (IOC, 2013 p.06).

Thus London 2012 Ltd prioritised and elevated a legacy agenda that was both politically astute and highly deliverable if the case for regeneration was taken full advantage of. According to the IOC (2013, p. 07):

> Olympic legacies generally fall into five categories – sporting, social, environmental, urban and economic – and can be in tangible or intangible form.

A tangible legacy sold as an 'Olympic legacy' that transforms London is a highly attractive deliverable of the Games. According to the BBC's Francis Keogh and Andrew Fraser (July 6th, 2005), one of the reasons London won the bid in 2005 was solely through this legacy agenda as it pertained to the regeneration of East London and specifically Stratford – never mind that the plan had not been thought through in detail as of yet. According to Keogh and Fraser (2005):

> Legacy was the word, and it was used often to deliver the message - give us the Games, and one of the world's great capital cities will be transformed. It was a vision that offered a new national athletics stadium, aquatic centre and velodrome. But it also fitted in with the idea of compact, non-wasteful Games, with several temporary venues to be relocated elsewhere in the UK. There would be no white elephants.

However, delivering the Olympic Legacy has been less straightforward than the early protagonists have claimed mainly because it was emotive, strategic, and a direct reaction to past failed Olympic bids. Hence, the question becomes whether or not the legacy games in 2012 were anything more than a land remediation project, aligned to objectives already existent in policy laid out for that part of London. Importantly the enduring legacy story only takes shape after the Olympics and the agenda changes, as will be shown later. The legacy story was sold as something at the beginning of the Olympic process and changed through time, being delivered as something else. Nevertheless, in 2005 London was awarded the 2012 Games based on a bid that promised an enduring legacy (UK Government, 2015).

Changing Legacy Plans:
According to Tessa Jowell, the Olympic Games would 'transform the heart of East London'. This was stated in a document entitled How the UK will benefit from the Olympic and Paralympic Games and was published by the Department for Media, Culture and Sport (DCMS) in 2007. The document set out plans to build the Olympic Park and create 4000 new homes within the park, create 9000 new homes in the general area after the Games for key workers, and improve transport infrastructure.

In 2008 the DCMS published a more detailed document on legacy plans regarding the transformation of East London. It stated that the regeneration of the Olympic Park and its surroundings – Stratford City and the Lower Lea Valley specifically – will create a major regional focus in East London for new jobs and sustainable growth. It will also play a key part in the wider plans for the Thames Gateway (DCMS, 2008).

In 2009 the Olympic Park Legacy Company was created. Moreover, the Olympic Host Boroughs (which included: Newham, Tower Hamlets, Greenwich, Waltham Forest, Barking & Dagenham and Hackney) developed a 'Strategic Regeneration Framework for reducing their levels of social and economic disadvantage to match other London boroughs (a process known as 'convergence')' (UK Government, 2015). Convergence, as a policy mechanism, is a way to allow borough agendas and regeneration agendas to work together (Growth Boroughs, 2017). While the Convergence agenda is primarily about improving the outlook for those who reside in East London, an article by The Guardian in 2013 highlighted that although information about Convergence targets are being published every year in order to meet the target set for 2030, statistics about demographic change are not being included thereby potentially skewing the data as the host boroughs continue to become transformed (Hill, November 28th, 2013). Nevertheless the development and transformation of the Olympic Park to Queen Elizabeth Park is a major component of delivering Convergence (OPLC, 2009).

In December 2010, the Government published a new legacy plan and the detailed plans underpinning it (DCMS, 2010). It identified four areas:

Harnessing the UK's passion for sport to increase grassroots participation, particularly by young people, and to encourage the whole population to be more physically active; exploiting to the full the opportunities for economic growth offered by hosting the Games; promoting community engagement and achieving participation across all groups in society through the Games; and ensuring that the Olympic Park can be developed after the Games as one of the principal drivers of regeneration in East London (DCMS, 2010 p. 01).

At this stage, the legacy of the Games regarding regeneration involved a large group of organisations: UK government and departments across central government, LOCOG and ODA (Olympic Delivery Authority); the BOA and BPA; the Mayor of London and GLA; the OPLC and Host Boroughs; and many third sector organisations. Moreover, the number of new homes to be created was lowered from 4000 to 2800 through the conversion of the Olympic Village. Most importantly however was the decision by the Mayor of London to create a caretaker for the Olympic Legacy project in the form of a Mayoral Development Corporation to hand over the project in 2014 – this would become the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) which was created a year later in 2011. This was a direct result of the Localism Act passed in 2011. The aim of the act 'is to facilitate the devolution of decision-making powers from central government control to individuals and communities' (Localism Act, 2011). Due to specific measures within the act local legacy plans could be transferred over to LLDC who then act as the primary caretakers of the Olympic site ensuring that legacy plans are adhered to. It was also at this time that utterings of the term 'Olympicopolis' began to be heard. At this point legacy plans were in the hands of the delivery partners; namely OPLC (soon to be LLDC).

b. Land Use:

2005 was a pivotal year – the London Development Agency (LDA) issued Compulsory Purchase Orders (CPOs) of the Olympic Park site in Stratford (BBC, 2005). The area was shaped by a history of land use (and disuse) reflective of East London: industrialisation, philanthropy, destruction through war and finally the pains of post-industrialisation (Davis, 2009). This resulted in highly diverse land utilisation consisting of mixed occupancies, formal and informal activity, artistic activity, light industry, and more (Ibid). According to the LDA (2005 and Davis 2009) there existed a patchwork of freehold plots. A complex web of ownership and tenancy peppered the area including freeholds that were sub-let and re-sub-let to small businesses (Davis, 2009). There was a mixture of formal as well as informal activity (some legal and some illegal). Many businesses had been there since around 1995 but one or two since the 1890s (Davis 2009). Public roads and roadways were owned by the usual public bodies such as Thames Water, as well as corresponding boroughs (Ibid). Later in 2005 a number of public bodies began buying land 'in the context of emerging regeneration strategies for the Lea Valley, Stratford City and the Thames Gateway, including Network Rail, Transport for London and the London Development Agency' (Davis, 2009, p. 15).

According to Davis (2009) the London Development Agency (LDA) were able to issue CPOs due to the Regional Development Agencies Act (1998). The CPOs took place in 2005 and 2006 (Ibid). The LDA implemented a relocation strategy which essentially revolved around purchasing the freeholds located in the area. Many businesses were relocated from the Olympic site to Hackney Wick and Fish Island (Davis, 2009). As we will see later, this is significant as top down policy (which is quasi-ad hoc regarding how regeneration was enacted in the Park) collides with the existence of an artists' quarter at the doorstep of the largest regeneration project in Europe.

Interestingly, while policymakers argued that the reason for choosing this part of Stratford as the Olympic site rests solely on the fact that it was a 'desolate wasteland' and brownfield site, others such as artists from Acme Studios, who owned a property on Carpenters Road from the 1980s until 2011, which was located in the area that was sold through the CPO, tell a different story. According to the Unearthed Project (Acme, 2011), this part of East London housed a thriving group of artists and artistic activities that date back to the 1980s. In fact, from 1985 to 2011, Acme Studios' building on Carpenters Road housed over 100 artists, many of who went on to become names in their own right. Artists such as Andrew Stahl, Simon English, Fiona Rae, Neville Gabie, Roger Kite, Kai and more had studios on Carpenters Road in the 1980s and 1990s.

c. Community of practice: Artist's cluster in Fish Island:

According to Evans (2016, p. 09):

> Stratford, where the Olympicopolis Waterfront development is to be located, had also been the focus of regional arts and economic development strategies prior to the Olympic project, with the creation of Stratford's cultural quarter, the extension of the Theatre Royal Stratford East and new arthouse cinema, and University of East London campus. So the presumption that the area was a cultural wasteland in need of a cultural regeneration makeover, is perhaps patronising and ignores several hundred years of arts and industrial creativity and innovation.

Fish Island is located in the north east part of Tower Hamlets in Bow East ward, close to Hackney Wick, on the boundary with Hackney and Newham Councils (LBTH, 2012). The LLDC have planning and regeneration responsibilities and control, but are not the landlords (Ibid). It is often called 'the Island' due to its spatial segregation from the surrounding city, with the A12 Highway as its western border and two man made canals, the Hertford Union Canal (1830) to its north and the Hackney Cut (1770s) Channel joining the River Lea Navigation at Old Ford Lock to its east (Rosner 2010). The area takes its name from the streets named after freshwater fish: i.e., Dace Rd, Monier Rd, Roach Rd, Smeed Rd., Bream St. (LBTH, 2009). LBTH has divided the area into precincts; the artists cluster is located in the central precinct inhabiting the abandoned warehouses and factories as well as three large live/work developments (Rosner 2010).

The demise of the Docklands that started in the late 1960s impacted heavily on the Lower Lea Valley (Rosner, 2010). The subsequent deindustrialisation of the following decades had a similar effect on most of the industrial east end of the city. This resulted in a complicated landscape within London where the east end was left to its own devices resulting in the pre-Olympics Lower Lea that many became accustomed to (Ibid).

Today the East End is synonymous with the creative and cultural industries (Butler, Rustin, 1996; Foord, 1999; Green, 1999; Pratt, 2009). According to Rosner (2010) this began in the late 1960s but more significantly in the following two decades where artists began to populate disregarded industrial buildings resulting in artistic/cultural clusters around Old Street and Brick Lane by the 1990s. The story then becomes a rather familiar one where internal migration becomes linked to rising property prices and where artists began to shift out further and further east. According to Rosner (2010 p. 15) 'first colonizers of Fish Island who broke out of its traditional strategic industrial land use were independent artists, designers and craftsmen looking for cheap and abundant studio space'. Since the first studios date to 1980 (Acme, 2011), it is not unlikely that the area had a healthy number of creative people there until the CPOs began to be enacted in 2005. Where there is consensus it shows that, the real accumulation of artists happened in and around 2008.

Because Fish Island is so isolated it allows this community to exist, you don't come here by accident…All the people here are of the same mid-set and interest, a community is quite inevitable. Fish Island Live/Worker since 2009 (Rosner 2010, p. 25)

Fish Island had a lot of attractive qualities for those wanting to move there. The first had to with the availability of space and the types of warehouses that existed.

I used to have a studio in Hackney, in the Kingsland Road which I liked, but the character was changing…I was saying this to a friend and she was here…I just looked at the studio and I just felt, this was right…I think with the studios you come and you feel comfortable in the space. That's important. I just liked the space, it was light, and I think just felt at home in the place. Fish Island Work-Only Artist since 1997 (Rosner, 2010, p.27).

Fish Island afforded artists and would be new live / work residents ample space, attractive space, the 'feel good factor', and a guarantee of no complaints. Arts and crafts artists could begin work on their next project whenever inspiration hits without the worry of having to abide to any rules or regulations – so a sense of community and shared activity are important drivers:

[M]ostly the communal atmosphere thing which you can get in houses too but I feel it just works more in warehouses because it's a really shared space, and generally they're all structured somewhat like this…where bedrooms become a much less important thing and it's all about living together in the main space and cooking together and actually sharing each others lives rather than just living in the same house….It's just a beautiful way to live. You end up with so much more space and you can do more fun things and just decide to build a wall if you want to build a wall, you can build benches if you want to build benches, and just all the things you wouldn't do if you were living in a normal house. And you can go out on the street to do it all, whereas if you did that in a terraced street…you'd probably get moaned out by your neighbors for making a lot of noise…and yeah, just freedom I guess, freedom to do what you want (Rosner, 2010, p.27).

There was a recognition early on by LBTH that live / work activities were going on in Fish Island and they were critical to the arts and crafts sector in the area. Local government encouragement of the live/work agenda was formally published in 2006 with the London Borough of Tower Hamlets Live/Work Report (Rosner, 2010). The report recognized it as valuably linked to the creative and cultural sector, including the quickly growing tech scene. Importantly, while the report espoused the importance of live/work arrangements, LBTH has maintained policy restrictions on live/work units on industrial land since November 2005 (Rosner, 2010). Therefore, only four live/work developments have actually been built on Fish Island: Ironworks (pre-Olympics), Omega-Works, 417 Wick Lane and Riverside Works (Ibid). Of these no developments have been granted planning permission since 2005 and most live/work units in former industrial buildings are not protected by the Council's policies (Ibid). Thus, warehouse resident-workers remain in insecure housing tenure at the will of the landlord as artists found out in 2017 when they were given eviction notices by the LLDC. This being said, the arrangement in Fish Island has always been around temporary use, this was not a surprise sprung on the artists at the last minute. This was expected, thereby showing how difficult it is to view the situation in Fish Island as one of top down policy being responsible for the displacement of artists. A more focused examination tells a number of different and complex stories tied to a history of land use and ownership. It is important to not view this scenario in linear terms.

Part 2: Post-2012:

Strategy: Tech hub dreams yet to be fulfilled

According to Kollewe (2012), the first legacy act was to turn the Olympic media centre near Stratford into a technology hub. The reason behind this at the time was an ambition to extend East London's 'Silicon Roundabout' from Old Street where thousands of tech start-ups exist (Ibid).

The LLDC, and successful bidder iCity, had originally planned to turn the media centre into offices, a data centre, London's largest TV studio and hi-tech production facilities (Ibid) which aligned with David Cameron's vision for the whole of London's East End to become a technology cluster. According to Nathan et al. (2015) the initial strategy had three aims: to grow the cluster; to attract outside investment; and to create economic linkages between Shoreditch and the Olympic Park after the games. This was the blueprint for the initial creation of Tech City – an extension of Silicon Roundabout (Old Street Roundabout) based on intensive marketing to international investors and a spatial strategy to create the cluster (Ibid). This was set to be a hi-tech 'rival to Silicon Valley', where David Cameron suggested to 'bring together the creativity and energy of Shoreditch and the incredible possibilities of the Olympic Park to help make east London one of the world's great technology centres' (Kollewe, 2012). Notably, while there was a legacy plan already in place the decision to create a Tech City connecting the park to Shoreditch was borne out of concerns that the media centre was not part of any tangible legacy plans and that it would be a monument to over spending thereby feeding the sentiment at the time which suggested that the Olympics was an extravagance that a nation going through austerity could not afford (Ibid). According to Nathan et al. (2015, p. 20), 'awareness of a growing technology cluster relatively close by created a tactical opportunity to link the two in the public mind, and thus to attract potential investors to the Park'.

Entrepreneurs were sceptical about the wisdom of trying to push companies out to the Olympic Park to make use of buildings such as the media centre. 'Startups sprang up in Shoreditch because it was cheap and vibrant and cool, and applying that to the Olympic site will be challenging,' Joe White, chief executive of the web design service Moonfruit, told *The Guardian* at the time of Cameron's announcement (Arthur, 2012). The tech hub, branded as Here East, has promised thousands of jobs; as of June 2017 Here East is sixty percent full, and whether or not it will fulfil its promise is yet to be seen. The type of occupancy in Here East at the moment might paint a slightly different picture, not one of a place where a buzzing start-ups culture permeates the halls and corridors, but one where a number of small, medium and large organisations are beginning to carve out something different. Nevertheless, initially the venture uncovered how policy makers and politicians misunderstood the 'tech scene' emanating out of Shoreditch by assuming one could simply extend it to the Olympic Park. It can safely be suggested that Here East will not be another Silicon Roundabout.

a) Olympicopolis:

Olympicopolis, now called the Culture and Education District (CED), was Boris Johnson's Olympic legacy vision unveiled in 2013 (Evans, 2016), which took inspiration from 'Albertopolis' (the development of the district around Exhibition Road in Knightsbridge) as it was known in the Victorian era (Ibid). This vision is exemplified by a number of education and cultural institutions setting up in the park, including University College London, London College of Fashion, Sadlers' Wells Theatre, V&A Museum and the Smithsonian Institute. This would join on to Loughborough University's and Here East (Evans, 2016). In the eyes of the LLDC investment can be brought into the park through outposts for cultural and educational institutions (Ibid). The total capital cost of the Olympicopolis development (CED) is put at £1.3 billion (Evans, 2016).

According to Evans (2016) fewer new homes will be built in the Olympic Park area than originally planned in 2004, by 2012 lowered by 2000, in part as a result of the Olympicopolis project – also as an example of changing legacy plans. The Mayor's rationale for this trade-off is that it would lead to more homes being built in the wider East London area in the future (Ibid).

The CED is comprised of two areas within the park: Stratford Waterfront and UCL East. Here East is in another part of the park but not officially part of the CED. Thus, the vision for the CED is now expected to create 3,000 jobs, attract 1.5 million visitors a year and deliver a £2.8bn boost to the economy of Stratford and the surrounding areas.

b) Land use: 'Creative Tensions'

The artists' cluster discussed in the previous section is currently under threat from housing policy and the power of property development. These factors have resulted in rising rents in the artist's quarter due to the development of new homes adjacent to Fish Island and Hackney Wick – it should be reiterated however that building this new housing was not sprung on to the artists, this was always the plan. Nevertheless, and as Evans (2016) has also stated, there seemed to have been a point where the 'Olympicopolis vision' including the creation of Here East had lost touch with the foundations of arts and crafts based activity that has been prevalent in both Hackney Wick and Fish Island for a very long time. This did not mean that they did not know about these activities. According to Evans this 'existing cultural quarter had already been recognised in successive cultural and creative policy initiatives prior to the Olympics, including the former Mayor's Creative London strategy which designated Stratford and Hackney Wick (either side of the Olympic Park) as one of the city's ten 'Creative Hubs'' (2016, p. 08). This example highlights the creative tensions that emerge when policy and 'the present' collide. The result has been a large scale loss of studio space:

> More than a quarter of the UK's studio buildings were located in the six Olympic host boroughs (Greenwich, Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Barking and Waltham Forest) prior to the Olympic redevelopment but much of this has been sacrificed - 10,000 sq' of studio space lost in the build-up to 2012 (e.g. ACME's Carpenters Road studios) with only small-scale and fragmented new provision in new developments (Evans, 2016 p. 08).

While this is not new and has been going on since the early 2000s, through associated CPOs and the officiated Olympic legacy plan, the scale and pace of change has increased dramatically in recent years. While the gentrification narrative is also nothing new, what makes this situation particular unique rests in the nuance of the story. This is a complicated situation as it highlights three overlapping aspects that need to be engaged with in order to understand the current situation and how these types of mega projects unfold.

First, in order to put this in context, in 2005 the London Development Agency began its compulsory purchase orders of the site that was to become the Olympic Village. At the same time, LBTH began a policy of refusal to grant planning permission to artists who were occupying the warehouses in the area in order to convert them into live / work spaces (Rosner 2010). Artists in this cluster were made aware by the LDA, LBTH, and later the LLDC, that they could be asked to leave with one month's notice and that the land they were occupying was in fact only available for temporary use. This effectively had a direct impact on how artists occupied and indeed validated their living space (Rosner, 2010). They essentially saw their living arrangement, or their live / work arrangement, as temporary which had implications (Ibid). In many cases, this was viewed as attractive by those who began occupying the warehouses of Fish Island primarily in 2006 (Rosner, 2010). However, as time passed this temporary use became problematic - and increasingly difficult to swallow- as the artistic community began to view the area as a viable long-term place to live and work. The reasons

became clear as to why many artists wanted to hold onto this area, it affords the community a number of things conducive to living the live/work lifestyle - a lifestyle that many in the community have become accustomed to. These include: 24 hour access to studios, 24 hour access to their chosen artistic practice, no need to comply with noise laws or deal with complaints, the right amount of space and light, cheap space, malleable space and the list continues. This shift in their position by the artists has been difficult for policymakers since the land is part of the legacy masterplan and being directly affected by the new housing estates of Sweetwater and East Wick being constructed adjacent to Fish Island. As a result of these estates, which have been part of the legacy masterplan since 2011, a number of planning policies have been put forth in order to grant the new housing complexes access to the Olympic Park but also the artist's cluster across the canal. This has resulted in the plan to build bridges across the canal which will directly affect the warehouses on Fish Island – thereby causing a direct flashpoint where policy and the changing reality on the ground conflict with each other.

This leads to the second aspect which revolves around the planning process being slow and how this is linked to new models of liveability for artists in Fish Island. Delivering the legacy masterplan means that planning approval must be given for any building works being done in the legacy zone, which is a slow process. Regarding the bridge example above, many of the planning proposals were placed a number of years ago only receiving approval now. Thus, while planning proposals go through the process of being approved things begin to move on - this is the nature of post industrial sites in our urban reality. This is planning blight in reverse, in this particular case because things have developed as time has passed as opposed to deteriorating. Enacting the legacy masterplan means that as the plan slowly becomes reality it must contend with the changing and morphing live / work environments for artists as they grow in Fish Island primarily – this is not unique to East London, but also happening in South London outside of the Olympic Legacy context. This has meant that the Greater London Authority now recognise the importance of live / work spaces for artist's clusters (usually studios made out of old warehouse space) and what the old industrial warehouses of areas like Fish Island contribute to artist's communities. According to the London Assembly (2017, p. 21):

> The issue of affordable workspace for London's artists is crucial. More than half of respondents to our investigation mentioned rising rental or property costs as a significant issue.

This has resulted in a push by policy makers for Section 106 (of the Town and Country Planning Act) provisions to be used in an innovative way for community benefit in exchange for planning approval: interpreted in this case to support work space for artists since around 2010. Section 106 (S106) Agreements are legal agreements between Local Authorities and developers; they drafted when it is considered that a development will have significant impacts on the local area that cannot be moderated by means of conditions attached to a planning decision. Thus the provision of social housing in a new housing development usually comes under the rubric of an S106 provision. In the case of artists work space, S106 is being used as the mechanism to create affordable space for artists in housing developments. This however has not been the solution that the GLA and others have envisaged. S106 provisions for artist space has resulted in mixed use policy which essentially creates flats at the top of a building where the ground floor is given over for artist use. The result has been that many of these ground floors have been empty for years as they are viewed as a poor substitute for what the warehouses provide. They also essentially remove many of the affordances that warehouses provide by bringing developer-led residential space into an artistic area. This leads to the third aspect.

The plan for the Olympic Park has been carried out thus far through the marrying of top down regeneration policy (primarily) with Olympic legacy ambitions that have been subject to change over time. This has been done at the detriment of some of the spaces and places of artistic activity. This is especially true with respect to the Culture and Education District which

is being pitched as an art and education cluster that complements the existing artists' cluster across the canal in Fish Island. This echoes the same problems and disconnects associated with ambitions surrounding Here East and its link to Silicon Roundabout. Here East is becoming something different - and this is exciting; but it is not a surrogate to the tech scene in Old Street. Similarly, the CED will be something exciting and different - but it will not be what policy makers might envisage.

As a result of these three aspects creative tensions have arisen in Fish Island – 'creative tensions' being the title of a report published by the London Assembly (2017). The much reported on flash point is Vittoria Wharf in Fish Island. According to London Assembly (2017, p. 06):

> [C]ulture-led regeneration has been criticised. It can lead to rapid gentrification and have negative impacts on long-term residents and the very artists, shop keepers and activists whose energies attracted regeneration. It is also seen as a process whereby government 'does to an area' rather than as something organic which better reflects local interests and needs.

In August 2016, the LLDC gave notice to artists at Vittoria Wharf in Fish Island that the studios in the converted warehouse were to be demolished to make way for a new pedestrian bridge mentioned earlier. According to London Assembly (2017, p. 17):

> The bridge would be needed to enhance connectivity between the Park and surrounding neighbourhoods. Planning permission for the bridge was granted in 2012 after consultation with the public. The LLDC has said that Vittoria Wharf was always meant to be a temporary solution and gave tenants one month's extra notice to move out and provided support to help relocate them, despite having no legal obligation to do so. In spite of many positive commercial outcomes, there have been undesirable and negative effects of regeneration in and around the Olympic Park. Some of the local residents and artists claim that they are being priced out by rising land values and feel unable to shape the changes in the fabric of the area. This has led to the save Hackney Wick movement which has galvanised a number of artist from Hackney Wick to start thinking of solutions to the immediate problem. This revolves around the creation of new types of housing models (not mixed-use buildings) that cater to the live/work lifestyle but also ticks the boxes for developers and the LLDC. A number of new types of housing are being tested in Fish Island, which will be the subject of future research.

Conclusions

The story of the development of the CED is far from clear or linear, and the question of when and where a starting point, or boundary might be drawn is clearly contentious. In the case of many of the institutions and agencies it is determined by the duration of a legislative control, and /or funding stream; not the processes that they have sought to modify. We have explored the consequences of this (unintended) disjuncture; in part, it is symptomatic of all 'mega-projects' albeit manifest in particular ways in each project.

We can note that the narrative of the re-use of the Olympic Park and facilities that would seamlessly be translated into a legacy is not so simple. Although out-with the scope of this report the saga of the Olympic Stadium, and its eventual use by West Ham is a case in point. Another is the 'flipping' of the Olympic media centre into a high-tech hub. Moreover, the initial legacy plan on the submission of the bid document was that the majority of the site be used for housing; this has also radically changed (especially as that housing that has been provided is not 'affordable' – as in 'affordable housing'). On top of this the new economic development was planned to be private (to repay the land remediation costs). However, as it turns out, most of the site will be in one way or another in the public sphere (or as a result of public funding). Finally, the fact that there was a community of artists in and around the site, perhaps the largest of its kind in the world, before the development. This creative community did not find voice and representation in the plans; although paradoxically the CED plans focused on culture and creativity but seemed to ignore the actually existing creative community. We have followed the fortunes of eviction and displacement of creatives and artists in what can only be seen as a gentrification of creative practice. One set of creatives are removed, and another replaces them. We are perhaps at the tail end of the struggle to have some representation of the original creative community in the park.

Whilst listing the points we have touched upon in this report seems to point the finger of blame at various institutions, this would be an inappropriate conclusion. What we have tried to show is that the nature of mega projects and their governance tends to create unrealistic expectations. Moreover, the fact that there are 'so many moving parts' all with their own unique time scales means that real time co-ordination is always a challenge. The case in point is the current problem with Vittoria Wharf: to a large extent it was unavoidable that it would end in conflict. The challenge is to develop governance that can ride with such challenges and offer innovative solutions that are a deviation from 'the plan', but achieve the overall objectives. Finally, rather than this being the 'end game' for the CED, we see it as merely the end of the beginning. Again, this stresses the subsidiary point made above: the need for long term evaluation (and here we mean 'radically' long term; not just 3-5 years, but 20 years or more) if we are to fully comprehend and capture processes.

As we proposed in the introduction to this paper we have sought to begin an evaluation of the networking and knowledge effects of the CED development. As precious little development exists in the core CED at present we are 'before the beginning'. However, this is an appropriate, indeed an ideal, place to begin a rigorous evaluation and from which to frame appropriate expectations. We have sought not to impose artificial or external limits to the project as these arbitrarily cut across long run, or complex, processes. We have also sought to point to the conflicts that emerge as a result of co-ordination and synchronisation issues (associated with the multiple timescales and stakeholder reporting requirements). We have pointed to the often-unintended outcomes of these processes, and the challenges these present to all stakeholders and their potential responses. We have also pointed to the fact that different stakeholders seek to gain various things from the CED location. We can also point out the fact that various stakeholders and potential occupants of the site will have differing capabilities and incentives to benefit from, or be insulated from, the CED. Large institutions with a substantial footprint, and institutional presence across London, and perhaps the world, such as UCL are Cleary less exposed to the risks and challenges of life in the CED. Other

institutions, that are re-locating wholesale to the CED will bear the most risk, and consequentially need to engage in institution and network making if they are not to lose out.

More generally, in shaping out analysis we were inspired by Flyvbjerg's (2003) mega-project dilemma framework; although not discussed here, he favours a process, or phronesis approach (Flyvbjerg, Landman et al. 2012). This helped us to see a bigger picture, spatially and institutionally, and not be confined by the 'site'. The first dilemma that Flyvberg and his team raise is that of 'overselling' the project to appear to minimize risks of stakeholders. In our project, we have identified the over-selling (and , as yet the under-provision, or under appreciation of network making). It is not that these are wrong, nor relevant. Other work suggests that they are critically important. However, at present there is an assumption that knowledge exchange (KE) effects simply follow, as night and day, from co-location. This is wrong. All partners will need to focus on KE and its facilitation if these (projected) benefits are to be realised. Otherwise, the CED will be a glorified state-subsided industrial estate, with good (state-funded) transport links.

We began with the expectation that we might provide some 'alternative' "metrics" (as in 'measures' that can be qualitative as well as quantitative). Instead, we have developed a more complex representation of action. This insight and perspective is important in itself, especially as set against the pragmatic rationalism of project planning and evaluation (Pawson 2006). The gap between is where, we would argue, the most interesting and innovative planning action takes place (but of course, it is seldom reported as it is by nature 'a fix'). Moreover, by shifting perspective from 'what should be' to 'what is' we could see our work feeding back into the development process by highlighting these contradictory or unintended outcomes (good or bad, depending on perspective, and who or what is affected). All actors are then given a new pivot of action which they can potentially use. However, we do realise that such an intervention challenges other of Flyvbjerg's dilemmas, that of transparency in the decision-making process.

So, we began this sub-project expecting it to be difficult; but it has turned out to be even more difficult than we expected. Moreover, initially at the overall project level we sought to organise our different journeys into evaluation by discrete themes we found that they increasingly overlapped and cross-referred to one another. This is to be expected, and in fact, the intended outcome: to produce a rich and multi-faceted understanding of a mega-project, and to offer methodological guidance, and conceptual focus to this, and similar studies. As noted above, a long road lies ahead for the CED project, and its evaluation. We are perhaps not even at the end of the beginning. It is important that an evaluation of the CED takes account of the following:

1. The long timescales involved (and the differing time horizons of stakeholders, communities and the wider public;
2. The complex and interwoven processes that cut across these timescales;
3. The variable geometry of the spaces of action and the boundaries thus created and perceived;
4. The changing priorities and short and long-term objectives of stakeholders, communities, politicians and policy-makers;
5. That 'impact' is experienced in a variety of ways, and over many time scales, by each stakeholder; and finally,
6. Co-location does not create knowledge exchange, and added value; network making and knowledge management/governance is the key factor.

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